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INTRODUCTION 
For forty years scholars have debated the concept of the efficient 
breach of contract. 1 One would think that everything that could be said has 
been said except to note the futility of the discussion. Yet, recently, the de-
bate has flared up once again. 2 The primary focus of the exchange is wheth-
er the expectancy measure of contract damages encourages the efficient 
breach and the reallocation of resources to those who value them the most. 3 
It is the type of issue that legal scholars delight in-all views can be sup-
ported or refuted and the likelihood of an empirical answer is remote. 4 This 
I. The efficient breach will be discussed in greater depth later, but for the uninitiat-
ed, the theory is that contract damages set at the expectancy level encourage efficient breach 
of contract. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1679, 1680-81 (2008); David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages 
and Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 398-400 (1998); Shawn J. Bay-
em, False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and Economics, 86 TUL. L. REv. 135, 
160-61 (2011 ); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 
568, 570, 572-73 (2006); William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 
48 DUKE L.J. 629, 653-54 (1999); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Perfor-
mance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 977-78 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Per-
formance]; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 559, 570 (2006); Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensa-
tory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1980); Daniel Friedmann, 
The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 1-2 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An 
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. CoLO. L. REv. 683, 686-
87 ( 1986); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses 
ofthe Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1944-45 (2011); Joseph M. Perillo, Mis-
reading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2000); Seana Shiffiin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 
MICH. L. REv. 1551, 1552 (2009) [hereinafter Shiffiin, Breach ofContract]; Seana Valentine 
Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. 708, 730-33 (2007) 
[hereinafter Shiffrin, Divergence of Contract]; Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific 
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 344-45 
(1984); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1365, 1394 (1982). 
2. Remarkably, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz have claimed to have found 
new ways to defend the efficient breach. See generally Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I. 
For a discussion, see infra Part IV. Responding directly to Professor Markovits and Schwartz 
are Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143 (2012), and Seana 
Valentine Shiffiin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159 
(2012). Markovits and Schwartz's use of myth should not be confused with the nihilistic 
view discussed. Their use of the term "myth" stems from their argument that paying damages 
for non-performance is not a breach because both parties understood that payment of damag-
es was an alternative method of performance. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1948-
49. 
3. See sources cited supra note 2. 
4. It would be difficult to claim that courts have found the scholarship very useful. 
Since 1970 the term "efficient breach" can be found in the literature over I ,500 times, but is 
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Article argues that there can be no answer, not even a reliable default posi-
tion. 
Although expressed in terms of expectancy, in reality the discussion 
began when expectancy was effectively "rebranded" in the 1970s as the 
remedy that leads to the "efficient" breach. 5 Until then, expectancy had been 
around for more than a century without causing much of a stir. 6 As soon as 
it was viewed as arguably efficient, the writing began unabated. Robert 
Birmingham appears to have been the first to note that expectancy could 
also be squared with efficiency. 7 Richard Posner along with Charles Goetz 
and Robert Scott echoed the same theme in the same period. 8 In fact, two 
ideas blossomed from this scholarship. One was that a breach of contract 
could be "efficient."9 The other was that expectancy encouraged or allowed 
the efficient breach. 10 
The rebranding of the 1970s did not please everyone and, by the early 
1980s, the battle was joined. 11 It is an odd debate for a number of reasons. 
Not only had expectancy been around for a very long time before becoming 
the focus of thousands of pages of writing, the rebranding was only that-
nothing substantive changed. In other words, expectancy was and still is just 
that. Like so much of law and economics, the upshot of many arguments 
was to provide a new basis for continuing the status quo. Thus, the thou-
sands of pages can only be explained by the discomfort with what expectan-
cy could be viewed as signifying. This leads to the question of what the 
mentioned by all federal and state courts only 140 times. This data is based on a Westlaw 
search under "TP-ALL" and "ALLCASES," respectively. 
5. This possibility seems to have been first noted by Robert Birmingham. See gen-
erally Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Effi-
ciency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970). 
6. See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON 
THE COMMON LAW 217-19 (1987). 
7. See generally Birmingham, supra note 5. 
8. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 554, 556-58, 578-93 (1977). Richard Posner's treatment begins 
in the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 55-59 (1972). In this edition, Posner notes that a penalty clause may prevent the 
efficient breach. !d. at 59-60. The analysis is also found in the 7th edition. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-26 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, 7th edi-
tion]. 
9. See Birmingham, supra note 5, at 281-82. 
10. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 736-37 (4th ed. 2004). This distinction 
is important because the theory that efficient breach exists is a different matter than the prac-
tical one of which remedy achieves that end. See id. at 737. 
11. Although a bit delayed, three articles in particular seemed to start the debate. See 
generally Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the 
Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1981); Farber, supra note 1; Ian R. Macneil, 
Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982). 
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brouhaha is about. What is the attraction? One explanation is that the con-
cept is easy to explain and to understand and provides a portal into a host of 
questions that are asked more generally about the application of economics 
to law. It is not unique in this respect. Most of law and economics is rela-
tively easy to grasp and raises more general issues. 
Commentators fall into three categories. In one category are those who 
seem comfortable with the idea of an efficient breach but focus on which 
remedy is consistent with that outcome. 12 Within this category the tension is 
usually between damages and specific performance or one of its surro-
gates.13 There have been defenses 14 and "new defenses" 15 of expectancy and 
even the possible conversion of one scholar, previously an advocate of spe-
cific performance, to a believer in expectancy. 16 Another category is com-
posed of those who believe that contract law has or should have a higher, or 
at least different, goal. They want to attribute a deontological value to a 
paid-for promise typically made at arm's length. 17 Typically, they find that 
12. See generally Ulen, supra note 1; Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I. Perhaps 
the most thorough explanation of why expectancy fails to result in efficient breaches is found 
in Farber, supra note I, at 1443-45. 
13. The term "surrogate" refers to the fact that liquidated damages and punitive 
damages for breach of contract often have the same effect as specific performance. See infra 
Part III. For a summary of the attacks on damages and defenses, see Eisenberg, Actual and 
Virtual Specific Performance, supra note I, at 981-89. Perhaps the earliest proponent of 
specific performance was Anthony Kronman. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Specific 
Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978). While this quibbling has gone on (and it is hard 
to see it as much more than that since it is of far greater interest to scholars than to anyone 
else), new information from behavioral economics and happiness studies complicate the 
issue in a manner that seems to make the prior arguments obsolete. See infra Section II.C. 
14. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8. 
15. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I, at 1939, 1942-43, 1961-2005. 
16. Compare Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 
( 1979), with Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I, at 1940, 1942. 
17. Perhaps the best-known effort to find a moral dimension to be promising is 
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981 ). See generally Shiffrin, Divergence of Con-
tract, supra note I; Shiffrin, Breach of Contract, supra note 1. Although not pursued here, 
the moral claim seems weak. In general, a moral claim would appear to arise from something 
other than a bargained or "paid for" exchange. In short, if a promise is conditional upon 
receiving a promise in return, it is hard to elevate it to moral status. Nevertheless, recent 
research suggests, or seems to suggest, that a moral component is attributed to a breach of 
contract. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuris-
tics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405,405-06 (2009); Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1004-06 (2010). 
Still, there is a difference between whether something is morally wrong and whether people 
think it is or say it is. For example, many people believe same-sex marriage is morally 
wrong. Moreover, the level of the moral response seems to depend on the type of impact. 
Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra, at 1014-16. This suggests that this type of moral indig-
nation is simply one that is not adequately accounted for in damage calculations. Randy 
Barnett argues that the moral element is consent. See generally Randy E. Barnett, ... And 
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there is a moral component of promising that a focus on expectancy and 
efficiency neglects or even discourages. 18 Finally, very recently, the impli-
cations of the teachings of behavioral economics and happiness studies have 
been applied to the issue. 19 The efficient breach, at the very least, seems to 
require rationality, a concept behaviorists have shown to be rather slip-
pery. 20 Recent studies of happiness have revealed how little we actually 
understand about what makes people feel better off. 21 This means the con-
cept of efficiency cannot be pinned down with certainty. Even more trou-
bling is the question of how to achieve it. 
This Article explains why the illusion of efficiency can be traced to 
the limited scope of prior analyses. For example, there has not been suffi-
cient focus on the problems of false positives and negatives created by ex-
pectancy and specific performance. 22 A false positive is an incorrect belief 
that a breach is efficient; a false negative is an incorrect belief that a breach 
would be inefficient. This problem and the ultimate indeterminacy of the 
efficient breach are linked to two additional failures. First, damages for 
breach of contract are often seen as existing for the purpose of compensat-
ing the non-breaching party. 23 In fact, from an economic perspective, the 
question is whether the breaching party internalizes the cost of the breach. 
Perhaps more pressing, the typical analysis does not examine the impact of 
the payment of damages on firms downstream from the breaching party. 24 In 
other words, a breach does not affect only those who are parties to the con-
tract. Yet most of the impact of the efficient breach is assessed by a narrow 
examination of the effects on the parties to the contract. Conventional 
scholarship about the efficient breach fails to extend the analysis far enough 
to fully grasp the complexity and likely futility of defining a remedy that is 
actually consistent with efficiency. 
Writings about efficient breach bring to mind a recent article in which 
Monroe Freeman criticizes "philosophizing about legal ethics."25 He com-
Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421 (1993). See also generally Richard A. 
Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1349 (2009). 
18. See sources cited supra note 17. For the most part, this Article steers clear of 
arguments about the morality of keeping and breaking promises; on the other hand, it does 
address some recent arguments that efficient remedies are morally supportable. See infra text 
accompanying notes 233-36. 
19. See infra Section II.B-C. 
20. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
22. See discussion infra Sections II.F, III.D. 
23. FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 757. 
24. Downstream refers to the impact on firms when they resell a finished good or 
purchase an input that is part of the manufacturing process of a good that will be sold to a 
final user or another manufacturer. 
25. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Law-
yers' Ethics, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91 (2012). 
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pares philosophizing about legal ethics to scholars in engineering arguing 
about the superiority of skyhooks over ordinary cranes or the impact of 
skyhook cables on air traffic. 26 In short, philosophizing about legal ethics is 
empty, self-indulgent, and meaningful to only a few. His comparison is 
equally applicable to discussions of efficient breach. Quite recently, two 
Yale scholars may have achieved the dubious pinnacle of skyhook philoso-
phizing in the context of the efficient breach. 27 Among other things, they 
present an argument favoring expectancy over specific performance without 
linking either to the idea of efficiency. If neither is consistent with efficien-
cy-and they do not demonstrate that they are-then the point is lost. 
Part I presents two examples of the efficient breach and explains why 
expectancy is regarded as efficient. One important aspect of the discussion 
is the focus on ensuring that a breaching party internalizes-treats as a 
cost-the harm to the non-breaching party. 28 These examples will be re-
ferred back to throughout the Article. Part II discusses the competing defini-
tions of efficiency that complicate the question. It also addresses some of 
the new teachings from behavioral economics and happiness studies that 
increase the elusiveness of the already elusive efficient breach. An econom-
ic construct-the contract curve-is employed to demonstrate the failings 
of expectancy. Part III examines specific performance. Specific perfor-
mance, probably the most favored remedy among those writing in the last 
forty years, is actually deeply flawed from the perspective of economic effi-
ciency. Part IV considers some more recent defenses of expectancy and 
shows that they are not new and rely on assumptions that should be discard-
ed, if they have not been already. In particular, the new defense seems to be 
an attempt to revive the notion of ex ante compensation, 29 a theory that has 
little merit in theory or practice.30 In conclusion, this Article notes that no 
remedy can be favored over any other as an incentive for efficient breach or 
non-performance. 31 Indeed, perhaps the underlying message of this Article 
26. See id. at 104; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. 
L. REV. 917, 920 (1986) ("Examples of truly brilliant economic theories abound. Unfortu-
nately, however, most are simply too brilliant to be true."). 
27. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I. 
28. See infra Section I. B. The implications of other remedies are discussed in Part 
III. 
29. See infra Part IV. 
30. Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
509 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). In addition, 
ex ante compensation was advanced by Richard Craswell in 1988. Richard Craswell, Con-
tract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 
632-33 (1988). 
31. See infra Part IV. The term non-performance is used here instead of breach 
because many potential breaches are avoided if the parties agree to non-performance-
usually at a price paid by the potentially breaching party. See infra text accompanying notes 
135-43. 
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is that rather than clarifying the law, scholarly efforts have made it cloudier. 
In fact, to the extent certainty itself is of value, the starts and stops of legal 
scholarship and its varying recommendations have not been particularly 
useful. Legal scholarship itself may, at best, have no effect and may add to 
the uncertainty that makes efficient non-performance less likelyY 
I. EXPECTANCY AND THE EFFICIENT BREACH: PASSING A ROPE THROUGH 
THE EYE OF THE NEEDLE 
A. The Standard Models33 
1. Modell 
The simple efficient breach typically follows a scenario like this. Todd 
contracts to buy Jane's 2012 Honda Accord for $6,000, which happens to 
have an average market value of $6,500.34 No money is paid down and de-
livery is to be in two weeks. A week after the contract is made Felix offers 
Jane $8,000 for the car. 35 He does this because red Honda Accords are hard 
to find, and he is completing his collection of Hondas. Jane, realizing the 
damages for breaching would be $500, breaches the contract with Todd, 
pays Todd the $500 damages to which he would be entitled under an expec-
tancy theory, and keeps a $1,500 "profit."36 
Why is this efficient? According to the theory, both Jane and Felix are 
better off because of the breach. 37 And, under the theory, Todd has his orig-
inal $6,000 and $500, making a total of $6,500, the market value of what he 
expected had the contract been formed. Most importantly, the Honda has 
found its way to the person who values it the most. This argument supports 
32. It is impossible to create a precise taxonomy of ways scholars have argued about 
expectancy, efficiency breach, and various remedies. It makes more sense to think in terms 
of questions presented: Is expectancy efficient? If it is, is it possible to produce the correct 
measure of expectancy? Are other remedies more consistent with efficiency? Should contract 
remedies be constructed to achieve the so-called efficient breach? Is there a moral basis for 
enforcing contracts that transcend efficient interests? 
33. Below, a variation of this simple model is presented that involves different facts 
and additional complexities. 
34. Why sell a car with a $6,500 market value for $6,000? Selling it at the market 
price may involve significant inconvenience, advertising, etc. That extra effort may not be 
worth it to the seller. 
35. There surely are other red Hondas at a price of $6,500 or even less, but Felix 
may not want to incur the inconvenience of searching and comparing. 
36. It is useful to note that in this example the automobile already exists, Jane is not 
a producer, and all costs of production have been absorbed. This is to be compared to the 
second example. See infra Subsection I.A.2. 
37. This may be less obvious for Felix, but he would not have paid $8,000 for the 
car unless he attributed even greater value to it. 
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disallowing punitive damages in contract because awarding punitive dam-
ages would raise the price of a breach and discourage it when it would be 
efficient to breach. Conversely, a reliance measure of recovery38 will under-
state the harm and encourage breaching too frequently. 
2. Model2 
Many readers will recognize this example as based on the contracts 
casebook standard, Peevy house v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 39 It is altered 
here a bit, and the importance of the example will not be evident until spe-
cific performance is discussed. 40 Willie and Lucille Peevyhouse contract 
with Garland Coal. 41 Under the terms of the contract, Garland Coal is per-
mitted to strip mine the Peevyhouse land. 42 In return, the Peevy houses re-
ceive royalties and, at the end of the process, Garland Coal agrees to restore 
the land.43 Restoration will cost $29,000, but the land will only be worth 
$300 more than it would be if it were not restored, and the Peevyhouses are 
only interested in the resale value of the land.44 Garland Coal breaches the 
contract and pays the Peevyhouses $300.45 Why is this efficient? First, the 
Peevyhouses have what they bargained for. They have land plus $300 that 
offsets the decrease in value caused by its stripped condition. Garland Coal 
is actually better off. It pays only for the damages it caused. Perhaps more 
importantly, $29,000 in resources is not used to create value of only $300. 46 
B. Internalization 
Notice in both models, the breaching party has caused the non-
breaching party to suffer a loss. There is no principled distinction between 
the harm or externality resulting from the breach and the externality in more 
typical examples of polluting factories or careless drivers. Moreover, to 
ensure efficient levels of production, producers must internalize their costs 
of production. 47 Harm caused to others is no less a cost of production than 
38. In the example, no information about possible reliance is provided. 
39. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962). 
40. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. 
41. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 110-11. 
42. !d. at Ill. 
43. !d. 
44. Seeid.atlll-12. 
45. !d. at 110, 114. 
46. The perceptive reader will note that the possibility that the Peevyhouses attribute 
value to the restored land beyond its resale value has not been raised at this point. This would 
have an important impact on efficiency. 
47. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (3d ed. 2000). 
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labor or raw materials. It is on the bases of those costs that firms determine 
their output and the price of that output. 48 
As an example, suppose a producer regularly emits pollutants that lead 
to disease and medical expenses for those affected. That is a cost of produc-
tion as much as electricity, wages, and raw materials. If those costs are not 
recognized (internalized), the producer will assume its costs of production 
are lower than they are. It will produce at inefficiently high levels and 
charge prices that are artificially low. 
In the first of the two examples, the internalization by Jane will notal-
ter her level of production, but the internalization is necessary nevertheless 
to ensure that her breach actually is consistent with the car finding its way 
into the hands of someone who values it more than Todd. In the second 
case, internalization is necessary not only to ensure the efficient breach but 
also to make sure downstream customers-in this case the buyers of coal-
pay a price that signals the actual costs of production. 49 
Although the emphasis is typically on compensating the non-
breaching party,50 that is not necessary for the efficient breach to occur. As 
an economic matter, all that efficiency requires is that the cost be recog-
nized or internalized by the breaching party. It is, after all, the breaching 
party to whom the "correct" signal must be transmitted. Thus, regardless of 
to whom the $500 is paid, Jane must factor in the $500 cost of her breach. 
Similarly, Garland Coal only need realize that it will pay $300 for its 
breach. Economics does not supply a basis for saying the amount internal-
ized must end up in the hands of the person injured. After all, perhaps it 
would bring greater happiness or utility to someone next door or the people 
at a local homeless shelter. To whom damages are paid is a distributive is-
sue and, for the most part, there is no economically correct distribution. 51 
Nonpayment may not seem fair to most, but that is a conclusion based, in 
large part, on moral as opposed to economic considerations. 
48. There are graphical representations of this process found in most economics 
books. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 197-99 (5th ed. 
2011). 
49. A firm that does not internalize fully will charge a lower price. Thus, the price 
will not reflect the actual resources used in production. In effect, consumers will buy items at 
prices that do not justify the use of resources in the production of what is purchased. 
50. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
51. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550-52 (1939). 
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II. DECONSTRUCTING EXPECTANCY 
A. What Efficiency? 
As noted, the idea that expectancy leads to efficient breaches came 
under attack over thirty years ago. 52 Much of that criticism is based on the 
practical point that determining the correct measure of harm is complex. 
There are attorney's fees, uncertainty, and a variety of other factors to con-
sider. 53 Thus, these arguments are principally about the unobtainability of 
true expectancy awards. 54 These practical considerations are related to a 
more important question: what exactly do we mean when discussing "effi-
ciency" in the context of expectancy? 
In economics, there are a variety of types of efficiency. 55 In the field of 
welfare economics, the relevant subfield for law and economics, three have 
at one time or another been the acceptable standards: utilitarianism, Pareto 
efficiency, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or Wealth Maximization. 56 As a 
historical matter, the measure of efficiency has changed for good reason but, 
in reality, all forms are flawed. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize well-being 
or happiness. 57 Most readers are familiar with the perceived deficiencies of 
utilitarianism and, therefore, efficiency standards based on maximizing 
utility. There are issues of utility monsters, questions of whether the aim is 
average total utility, and so on. 58 The biggest issue is that we cannot know if 
something is efficient from a utilitarian perspective because it is impossible 
to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. 59 For example, in the first hy-
pothetical, both Jane and Felix must have increased their own utility; other-
wise they would not have changed their positions. In effect, they were each 
involved in intrapersonal comparison and each felt happier with the out-
come of the breach and resale. 60 We cannot be so sure about Todd. Is Todd 
52. See supra note II and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 30, at 637. 
54. Farber, supra note I, at 1444. 
55. See generally HARRISON, supra note 48, at 34-51. For a detailed and far-reaching 
analysis, see RICHARDS. MARKOVITS, TRUTH OR ECONOMICS 48-62 (2008). 
56. See HARRISON, supra note 48, at 34-51; MARKOV ITS, supra note 55, at 48-62. 
57. See R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 118-34 (1963); J.J.C. SMART & 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 27-28 (1973). 
58. HARE, supra note 57, at 118-34; WILLIAM H. SHAW, CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: 
TAKING ACCOUNT OF UTILITARIANISM 31-32, 119-20 (1999); SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 
57, at 27-28. 
59. MARKOVITS, supra note 55, at 120. As an example, we cannot know whether the 
disutility caused by taxation is offset by the utility experienced by those who use a publicly 
maintained highway system. 
60. On the other hand, their decision may turn out to be wrong, which is another 
complexity expectancy supporters tend to ignore. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying 
text. 
A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach 177 
exactly as happy with the $500 as he would have been with the car? There is 
no way to know. More importantly, if he feels worse off, does the increased 
utility enjoyed by Felix and Jane offset the decline in Todd's? No one sug-
gests this comparison can be made. 
This realization made another kind of efficiency better suited for wel-
fare economics. The notion of Pareto efficiency eliminated the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. 61 For a breach or any redistribution to 
be Pareto superior, all those involved and any third parties must be in a bet-
ter position or a position that is no worse than before the change. 62 The best 
way to assess whether this outcome has occurred is by determining if all 
those involved have or would have consented to the change. 63 This cannot 
be the "efficiency" referred to when expectancy is applied because, in the 
hypothetical, Todd has not consented; it is impossible to know if he is better 
off. If he voluntarily agrees to accept damages instead of the car, it would 
be a different matter. In the hypothetical, however, the breach is forced up-
on him. 
Obviously, whether all parties would have consented or were at least 
indifferent is a heavy burden for any changes based on Paretian standards of 
efficiency. It does protect individual autonomy but at the expense of a great 
number of redistributions that may seem fair or even utility enhancing from 
a common sense perspective. 64 At the extreme, a small tax could not be im-
posed on even the wealthiest person for the purpose of relieving the pain of 
the poorest. In fact, any transfer of wealth by government action would fail 
the test. By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, due in large part to the 
failings of utilitarianism and Paretian standards, there was a serious question 
of whether welfare economics had anything useful to say for policy mak-
ers. 65 
In the midst of this lack of direction, two economists, Kaldor and 
Hicks, essentially cobbled together a substitute notion of efficiency. 66 It is 
61. See Jefftey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obli-
gations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. I, 2 (1997). 
62. A change is Pareto Superior if those involved are at least as well off as they were 
before the change. See id. at 2. A distribution is Pareto Optimal if there are no changes that 
would be Pareto Superior. See id. at 2 n.12. 
63. !d. at 3. 
64. See id. 
65. See Kaldor, supra note 51, at 549. 
66. The initial question was if utilities cannot be compared unless one makes the 
assumption that individuals are uniform in their preferences and the ability to sense happi-
ness, what can economics offer with respect to policies? /d. at 549-50. To this, Kaldor an-
swered: 
[W]here a certain policy leads to an increase in physical productivity, and thus of 
aggregate real income, the economist's case for the policy is quite unaffected by 
the question of the comparability of individual satisfactions; since in all such cases 
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actually more of a stand-in for utilitarianism than for Paretianism67 because 
it sidesteps the interpersonal comparison of utility problem by substituting 
monetary value for utility. 68 On the other hand, it does not remedy the defi-
ciency of not knowing if anyone is actually better or worse off. In effect, 
resource allocation is efficient if those benefiting could compensate those 
made worse off. 69 Compensation itself is not necessary. In the case of a con-
tract breach and payment of damages, compensation does occur, but there is 
no way to know whether the compensation is sufficient. 70 The amount the 
breaching party is required to internalize may or may not equal the amount 
of loss experienced by the non-breaching party. 71 It should be exactly the 
amount that leaves the non-breaching party indifferent between perfor-
mance and breach with the payment of damages. 72 
B. Expectancy and Efficiency 
It is unlikely that expectancy is consistent with any of these versions 
of efficiency. The reasons for this in the case of utilitarianism and Pareto 
standards are easy. From the standpoint of utility it is simply impossible to 
determine whether the gainers-Jane and Felix in the first example-are 
better off than the loser-Todd-as far as utility. Similarly, from a Paretian 
standpoint we cannot know if Todd would have consented to the breach 
even though he then received $500. 
It is most important to examine the Kaldor-Hicks standard since it is 
the most commonly used. Here the efficiency of expectancy is questionable 
it is possible to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some 
people better off without making anybody worse off. 
!d. at 550. Hicks, writing three months later, applied the same notion to the special case of 
organizing an industry into fewer firms: "Before recommending in practice a policy of shut-
ting down redundant firms, we ought to be sure that the full condition is satisfied; and we 
ought to be very sure that the discarded factors will in fact be transferred to more productive 
uses." J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 EcoN. J. 696, 710-11 (1939); 
see also J.R. Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers' Surplus, 8 REv. ECON. STUD. 108, Ill 
(1941). 
67. See Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Con-
tract Law Remedies, 56 UCLA L. REv. 59, 71 n.50 (2008). 
68. See id. at 96. Efforts to square their notion of efficiency with Pareto standards 
have also been and seem to be implicit in some recent work. See RICHARD A. PosNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 94-95 (1981). For the most part, it appears the moral claim for Kal-
dor-Hicks efficiency has not been compelling. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and 
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 534-40 (1980). In effect, Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency fails to be utility maximizing, and it fails to protect individual autonomy. 
69. The move to monetary value dampens the utility monster problem somewhat, 
but does not eliminate it. Jimenez, supra note 67, at 96. 
70. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note 1, at 977. 
71. !d. at 977-78. 
72. See id. at 979. 
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at best. To appreciate why, it is useful to understand the notion of the "con-
tract curve."73 The contract curve is all the price points that would leave two 
potentially contracting parties who are contemplating an exchange better 
off.14 Rational actors would choose at least one of those points. 75 For exam-
ple, going back to the original sale of the car by Jane to Todd, suppose the 
least Jane would take for the car is $5,000 and the most Todd would pay is 
$7,000. The contract curve is all the prices between those two amounts. 
Since the lowest Jane would take is $5,000, at that price she is indifferent 
between selling and keeping the car or just barely in favor of selling it. In 
the original sale, the sum of $6,000 is clearly on the contract curve. 
Now think of an ex post contract curve. It could be after the original 
contract is made and before the car is delivered or, perhaps, even after per-
formance. In either case, it reflects a period after Jane is presented with Fe-
lix's opportunity. Under the first scenario, suppose Jane receives Felix's 
offer just before she delivers the car and knows she will be forced to specif-
ically perform the contract if she does not deliver the car to Todd. The con-
tract curve extends from the least Todd would accept to relieve Jane of her 
obligation to the most Jane would pay. In the latter case, she has delivered 
the car and would like to buy it back in order to resell to Felix. Here the 
contract curve extends from the lowest amount Todd would accept for the 
car and the most Jane would pay. 
Is there any reason to believe that $6,500--assuming damages are 
$500--is on the contract curve between Todd and Jane at this point? It must 
be for the $500 expectancy to be efficient. There are at least three reasons to 
doubt that it is. Perhaps it would be efficient for Jane based on the profit 
that could be made if she could sell the car to Felix. The problem is at the 
other end ofthe curve. Todd's perception of himself has switched from that 
of a buyer to a seller. Why assume that $6,500 is acceptable to Todd? There 
appears to be no good reason for that assumption. Indeed, a great deal of 
empirical research suggests that it would be the wrong assumption. 
First, since Todd has moved from buyer to seller he may very well be 
affected by what behavioral economists call the endowment effect. 76 What 
73. A derivation of the contract curve can be found at JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES 
THEEUWES, LAW & ECONOMICS 185-89 (2008). 
74. /d.at189. 
75. See id. 
76. The endowment effect is related to what is often called the wealth effect. See 
Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of 
Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663, 689 (1994). The wealth effect occurs 
when how much someone is willing to pay or accept for an item is determined by his or her 
wealth. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to 
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 85-87 (1993). The endow-
ment effect takes this phenomenon one step further and describes situations in which people 
value something more when they own it than when they do not own it. See id. at 89; Jack L. 
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sociologists and behavioral economists have determined is that people can 
attribute different values to the very same thing depending on whether they 
perceive it as belonging to them. 77 Once the contract is made, Todd may feel 
that the car is essentially his, and comparing his valuation after the contract 
is a different matter than simply averaging the selling price of cars. 
Second, and putting aside the fact that Todd is different before and af-
ter the contract, there is the disconnection between the market value and a 
point on the contract curve for any particular person. Would the amount that 
would be paid in damages and which corresponds to market value be on the 
contract curve? The question again is why this assumption would be made. 
The market value is an average. This means approximately half the sales of 
a comparable car took place at a higher price and half at a lower price. 78 It is 
quite possible that the contract curve for a number of people did not extend 
as low as $6,500. More importantly, it tells us that we have no idea how 
much Todd valued the car, and awarding him an average is a bit like giving 
everyone who walks into a clothing store a medium sized shirt and then 
assuming it fits. 
Third, suppose $6,500 appears to be on the Todd/Jane contract curve 
in that it would be exactly the equivalent of the minimum amount necessary 
for Todd to buy a replacement car and cover any incidental expenses. Does 
this mean that Jane has fully internalized the harm caused by the breach if 
she is forced, through expectancy, to compensate Todd at this amount? This 
is a closer question and may depend on exactly what is defined by the con-
tract curve. Behavioral economics tells us that it is entirely possible that 
points that would appear to be on the contract curve may be objected to by 
Todd because they do not conform to his sense of fairness. 79 This can be 
Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental 
Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 516 (1984); 
Korobkin, supra, at 688-91. This appears to be independent of the overall impact of owning 
the item on one's actual wealth. In both cases, there is a difference between what people are 
willing to offer for an item and what they would accept to sell the item. See Hoffman & 
Spitzer, supra, at 87-91; Korobkin, supra, at 688-97. 
77. Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 76, at 87-91; Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 76, 
at 516-18; Korobkin, supra note 76, at 688-97. 
78. What is actually described here is the median. Market value is the mean, and to 
be precise, there is no assurance that half of the prices are above this amount and half are 
below. 
79. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 445, 468-80 (1994). Technically, the contract curve has all the points 
that lie between the most a buyer would pay and the least a seller would take. /d. at 474. 
Whether a sense of justice actually narrows the conventional curve depends on one's view of 
the curve. /d. Conventional representations do not allow for situations in which an amount 
would seem to make the buyer or seller better off but is unacceptable because of the issues 
discussed here. Nevertheless, whether regarded as a deviation from the contract curve or a 
conventional contract curve, the point is that this sense of justice narrows the range of ac-
ceptable prices. See id. 
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understood by reference to ultimatum games. In these two person games, 
Party One is given a sum of money and may keep it if Party Two agrees. 
The idea is that the original party will offer some portion of the initial 
amount in order to get permission from the other party. They have only one 
chance to do this, and there is no communication. From an economic per-
spective, offering a penny or even nothing should do the trick. 80 Even if 
Party One offers nothing, Party Two is no worse off, and even if a very 
small amount is offered, Party Two is better off. The actual experiments 
suggest something different. In fact, those in the position of Party One typi-
cally offer more than the minimum, and those in the position of Party Two 
reject very low offers. In a sense, the lowest that is acceptable (even though 
it might appear to be on a hypothetical contract curve) is not at the low point 
of the contract curve. 81 Put in the context of the hypothetical, the least Todd 
would take it is higher than the minimum necessary for Todd to buy the 
substitute car and cover any other losses. 
One possible way to bring expectancy back into line with efficiency is 
to assume away any factors that may cause a difference.SZ For example, as-
sume the breach involves a fungible good. 83 The widget, of which there is 
no shortage in legal scholarship, is a possibility. 84 One widget is like any 
other. As long as the non-breaching party receives damages that allow him 
or her to acquire widgets, how could a breach not be efficient?85 Under this 
scenario, there is no performance, but a check arrives with a note and the 
recipient has no reaction. In other words, the check is a perfect substitute for 
performance-the recipient has no preference for a particular supplier, and 
the breaching party has included in the check compensation for all inci-
dental and consequential damages. This compensation would have to extend 
to presumably beneficial activities put aside while a covering transaction 
takes place. The possibility a buyer is completely indifferent between actual 
performance and "performance" in the form of notice of breach and a check 
80. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 22 (1992); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness 
as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 728, 736 
(1986); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 196 
(1988). The possibility of zero can be understood by remembering that the Party Two is no 
worse off if he receives nothing, and Party One is better off meaning the outcome is con-
sistent with Paretian and, possibly, utilitarian standards. 
81. Again, this depends on one's preference about how to view the contract curve 
but is irrelevant with respect to the analysis. 
82. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1950-51. 
83. I d. at 1954. 
84. According to a Westlaw search, the term widget has been used over 5,000 times 
by articles found in the "TP-ALL" database. 
85. This would have to include all possible sources of injury. Naturally, in contract 
law, this is subject to a foreseeability limit. The inexactness of foreseeability is another 
source of difference between expectancy and full internalization. 
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seems unrealistic. 86 Indeed, Professor Melvin Eisenberg argues that "dam-
ages under the [expectancy theory] always fall short of making a promisee 
indifferent between performance and legal relief." 87 
Another factor that makes the efficient breach idea elusive involves a 
different perspective altogether and focuses on the breaching party. Again, 
the party receives a check for damages and has no reaction-the check is as 
good as performance. The problem is that sometimes this may be better than 
performance-the breach is a blessing, and expectancy based on market 
value overcompensates. Here again the breach is not efficient because the 
amount internalized is too much. How is this possible? When making the 
contract, the non-breaching party understood that he or she would be held to 
the bargain. The risk of buyer's or seller's remorse had been assumed. The 
arrival of the letter breaching the contract and the check, if it truly is expec-
tancy, is a windfall. The breaching party has actually bestowed an unex-
pected option on the non-breaching party. At the point of the breach and 
with check in hand, the non-breacher has a second chance to evaluate the 
options, this time with the benefit of further information. No doubt some 
non-breaching parties will regard the second chance as worthless and others 
will be quite delighted. 
C. Happiness and Efficiency 
In the above analysis, there is an underlying assumption that efficien-
cy represents a single discoverable amount. 88 The teachings of happiness 
studies89 over the last several years make it clear that the question of com-
86. See generally Farber, supra note 1. 
87. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note I, at 977. 
88. See supra Section II.B. 
89. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS ( 1985); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS 
AND ECONOMICS: How THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); 
DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF 
WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS 
HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WISDOM (2006); JENNIFER MICHAEL 
HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYTH: WHY WHAT WE THINK Is RIGHT Is WRONG (2007); RICHARD 
LA YARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005); MATTHIEU RICARD, HAPPINESS: 
A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S MOST IMPORTANT SKILL (Jesse Browner trans., Little, Brown 
& Co. 2006) (2003); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affec-
tive Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005); Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, I 00 
PNAS 11176 (2003); Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theo-
ry, 111 EcoN. J. 465 (2001); Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase 
the Happiness of All?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 0RG. 35 (1995); Tiffany A. Ito & John T. 
Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility Appraisals, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 470 (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 
1999); Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happi-
ness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 527 
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pensation is far more complicated. It may, in fact, make any workable no-
tion of efficiency, and therefore the efficient breach, unobtainable. 90 To un-
derstand the problem, it is important to note that modern notions of efficien-
cy are assessed at the time decisions are made. 91 Take a simple example and 
assume rationality by both parties. Jack offers a book for sale for $20. The 
implication is that John expects anything he can use the $20 for will yield 
greater than or the same utility as the book. Diane buys the book at that 
price. At that point she believes the book will result in the same or more 
utility than anything else that can be purchased for $20. When the parties 
make this decision they are acting on decisional utility-how they think 
they will feel after the exchange. 92 There would be no contract if that antici-
pated state were not superior to the status quo. 
Studies indicate that experienced utility-what actually happens-can 
be different from decisional utility. 93 A few days after the exchange, Diane 
may wonder why she paid $20 for a book she dislikes. And Jack may real-
ize, too late, that he took a lot of pride in having that book in his collection. 
The problem is that if efficiency is about actual utility, then decisional utili-
ty is an imperfect substitute. The difference between decisional and experi-
enced utility can mean simply that things do not turn out as expected. One 
factor that seems to play tricks with utility is the passage oftime. 94 One may 
experience something that is quite unpleasant and then take great pride in 
having survived the experience. In effect, an experienced disutility can lead 
to utility as one reflects on the experience. Conversely, something very en-
joyable at the time may turn out to be regretted. 
The possibility that traditional measures of efficiency are, at best, 
measures of anticipated utility means that the amount internalized by a 
(2003). For an excellent selection of readings, see generally WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra. 
90. See sources cited supra note 89. 
91. This notion can be traced to Paul Samuelson's concept of revealed preference. 
Samuelson noted that we can only know what makes people better off by observing the 
choices they make. Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Prefer-
ence, 15 ECONOMICA 243 (1948); Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Con-
sumer's Behaviour, 5 EcoNOMICA 61 (1938). This was not always characteristic of utilitari-
anism. Bentham viewed the question as more in line with what was actually experienced. 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 
(Dover Publ'ns 2007) (1780). Thus, "[b]y utility is meant that property in any object, where-
by it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness ... or ... to prevent 
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness." !d.; see also GEOFFREY SCARRE, 
UTILITARIANISM 72-81 (1996). 
92. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to 
Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 375 (1997). 
93. Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 89, at 3, 17. 
94. See generally id. 
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breaching party may or may not offset the disutility caused by the breach. 
For example, in the Honda hypothetical, suppose Jane does breach and 
writes a check to Todd who is actually indifferent between the car and dam-
ages. He then combines his $6,000 (remember there was no prepayment) 
with $500 and buys a substitute car. It turns out to be a disappointment, not 
because of the car itself, but because Todd way overestimated how much he 
would enjoy the car. In fact, the original contract, as experienced, would not 
have been efficient in any meaningful sense because Todd made a mistake. 
Paying Todd $500 is based on decisional utility, which he now knows was 
mistaken. A remedy based on actual or experienced utility could be quite 
different and would reflect an accurate level of internalization. 
In addition, although controversial, some examinations of happiness 
suggest that, whatever heightened sense of utility or disutility someone ex-
periences, his or her sense of well-being tends to return to a set point level 
ofhappiness. 95 If so, Todd may be beside himself when Jane does not deliv-
er the car. In a week he may not care that much, and in a month the breach 
may be but a faint memory. How much should Jane internalize in such a 
case? Obviously one cannot equate utility with dollars in the first place, but 
it is even more difficult when utility or disutility may spike for some people 
but remain constant for others. 
D. Moral Objections 
As noted in the Introduction, this Article does not take on the inde-
pendent issue of the morality ofbreaching.96 At least in theory, moral objec-
tions or ones based on principle are not ones that can be eliminated by com-
pensating the person who is morally offended.97 Promise breaking or breach 
of contract may be, for some, morally objectionable in the sense that com-
pensation is not a substitute for not keeping a promise. On the other hand, a 
breach of contract can elicit a number of negative psychological reactions, 
some of which may be viewed as morality-based but which can also be par-
tially offset by compensation. 98 
95. See Phillip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning 
the Good Society, in ADAPTION-LEVEL THEORY 287 (M.H. Appley ed., 1971); Andrew J. 
Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation of Compensatory 
Damages, in LAw AND HAPPINESS 217, 221 (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sun stein eds., 20 I 0); 
Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) 
About Pain and Suffering, in LAW AND HAPPINESS, supra, at 195, 196. 
96. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
97. In cases in which compensation is not adequate, one can view the moral value as 
having lexical priority. 
98. See sources cited infra note 99. As a baseline, consider someone who is morally 
offended by a breach, whether it involves one of his or her own contracts or that of another 
person, and is without regard for the damages awarded. This objection is based on principle. 
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For practical purposes, there may not be an easy way of separating 
moral objections from objections based on personal disutility. 99 For exam-
ple, a breach may be regarded as unfair, unjust, exploitative, or even anger 
inducing. All of these feelings are negative--certainly no one prefers to feel 
they have been treated unfairly or exploited. This disutility is no less a nega-
tive externality than any other, and in theory, an efficient remedy accounts 
for these negative feelings. 100 The point is that if expectancy is to be effi-
cient, it must address both types of "moral" objections. It cannot, however, 
address pure moral objections at all. In addition, a remedy that returns the 
person whose "moral" objections are compensable to a point of indifference 
may not be impossible in theory but, in practice, cannot be based on much 
more than a guess. 
E. Uncertainty 
A final note is in order that pertains to timing and uncertainty. For the 
most, part when expectancy and efficient breach are discussed, the situation 
is one in which there are no complications. The amount of expectancy is 
easily determined, and there is no uncertainly about whether a breach has 
occurred. 101 As soon as the possibility of a trial arises, the analysis shifts. 102 
First, the perception by both parties shifts from a certain recovery or pay-
ment to an expected recovery, which is the probability of prevailing times 
the expected recovery. 103 Second, disputes about whether expectancy is due 
at all means incurring transaction costs. These costs may eventually out-
weigh any gain associated with redirecting the good or service involved to 
In the purest sense, a moral objection is not one that evaporates if compensation is high 
enough. Indeed, it is hard to view an objection as morality based if it were possible for a 
sufficient damages award to render the person indifferent between a breach and performance. 
99. The difficulties of making this distinction is suggested by studies reported on by 
Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 17, at 423; see also Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual 
Specific Performance, supra note I, at I 008-1 0; Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promis-
sory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REv. 859, 877-78 (2000); 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Exper-
iment, 108 MICH. L. REv. 633,637 (2010). 
I 00. Moreover, the person may feel less disutility if sufficient damages are awarded. 
Certainly, it may vary with the moral sensitivities of the non-breaching party. 
101. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
31-33 (2d ed. 1989); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 47, at 189-90; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET. 
AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 20-22 (7th ed. 2008). This is not to suggest the 
authors cited here do not understand the complexity, but the starting analysis is typically one 
that omits much of reality. 
I 02. For a discussion of the impact of risk and different attitudes toward risk on con-
tract breach, see generally AlexY. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 
75 (1984). See also Farber, supra note I, at 1444. 
103. Ultimately, expected costs have to be included in the decision-making process. 
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its more valued use. 104 In fact, once there is any disagreement about whether 
there is a breach and what the damages are, costs begin to offset whatever 
was efficient about the breach in the first place. 105 
This means, if one returns to the hypothetical, when Jane hears of Fe-
lix's offer she may not think, "If I write a check to Todd for $500, he will 
have no complaints, and I will profit." Instead, the thought process might be 
something like this: 
If I breach, Todd may not take $500. In fact, I could be in a trial that will be a 
headache, and I may pay more or even less than $500. In addition, if word gets out, 
it may mean my reputation is harmed, and I will have a tougher time selling cars in 
the future so maybe I should offer Todd not just $500 but some additional amount 
to say good things about me (or at least not leave negative feedback on eBay). In 
fact, if we go to trial and he has convincing expert witnesses, I may pay much 
more. 
Given these circumstances and uncertainties it is often difficult to un-
derstand, based only on this small dose of reality, what forty years of dis-
cussion and debate about efficiency and expectancy have achieved in terms 
of guidance for those who actually apply contract law. 106 An amount that 
will achieve expectancy is only relevant in the context of several other vari-
ables. The concept of a single treatment107 for all types of breaches in all 
circumstances is an illusion primarily found only in legal scholarship. 
F. False Positives, False Negatives, Incorrect Signals, and Downstream Ef-
fects 
When expectancy damages are less than fully compensatory, it creates 
a false positive signal that a breach is efficient. It is a false negative when 
overcompensation occurs. This is all fairly obvious, but the importance has 
not been fully explored. To understand the impact of false positives, consid-
er the altered Peevyhouse case described above. 108 As casebook readers will 
recall, the Peevyhouses eventually recovered $300 for the breach. 109 Again 
though, assume they valued the restoration of the land at $29,000. 110 As 
noted in the Introduction, the compensation to the non-breaching party is 
104. See Farber, supra note I, at 1444. 
105. See id. 
106. This is not to say that there are not excellent articles on the complexities. In 
particular, works by Richard Craswell, supra note 30, and Daniel Farber, supra note 1, are 
excellent and early sources pointing out how difficult it is to put the notion of efficient 
breach into practice. 
107. As will be illustrated below, the illusion of the single remedy solution also ex-
tends to specific performance. See infra text accompanying notes 192-205. 
108. See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
109. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1963). 
110. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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the price the breaching party pays in order to breach and the cost it internal-
izes. 111 It is, thus, as much a cost of operating the business as paying for 
labor or materials. For prices and output to be efficiently set in downstream 
markets, the parties selling in those markets should internalize all costs of 
production. 112 Otherwise, economists say that production in those markets is 
at allocatively inefficient levels. 113 In effect, the price charged for the down-
stream output, which is itself a function of costs of production, will send an 
incorrect signal to buyers. In the Peevyhouse scenario, as altered here, a 
$300 award results in a false positive in the sense that the correct signal to 
Garland would be that the land should-from an economic standpoint-be 
restored. Garland Coal does not pay the actual cost of its breach but a much 
lower amount. Not only will the inefficient breach occur, but Garland Coal 
is likely to charge lower prices and sell higher quantities in the markets in 
which it sells than would be the case if they paid $29,000 in connection with 
restoring the land. In fact, coal would be underpriced relative to other fuels 
whose sellers do internalize all costs of production. This is the same analy-
sis that would apply in the case of non-payment for any input. There are, to 
be sure, a number of conditions that must be fulfilled to achieve efficiency 
in output markets, 114 but, even if those were satisfied, the downstream im-
pact of false positives would prevent prices and quantities from adjusting to 
allocatively efficient levels. 
Changing some of the assumptions above alters the outcome only 
slightly. Suppose now that the land can still be restored for $29,000. The 
Peevyhouses, however, only feel $15,000 worse off with unrestored land, 
and the diminution in value remains at $300. The damage to be internalized 
would be $15,000. In this case, unless third parties are negatively affected, 
it would be inefficient to restore the land and it would not be restored-
Garland would still breach and pay a price for its breach that is well below 
111. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
113. Allocative efficiency can be understood by noting that people place a certain 
value on goods or services. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 73, at 22. The production of 
those goods and services involve the use of inputs purchased by producers. !d. at 23. Those 
inputs have uses in the production of goods and services but are allocatively efficiently used 
when drawn into their most valued uses. See id. Output is allocatively efficient as long as the 
value attributed to the goods and services exceeds the costs of the inputs. See id. 
114. For a market to achieve allocative efficiency, input markets must be highly 
competitive. In reality this is unlikely, leading to the possibility that the best to hope for are 
"second best" solutions. See Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic 
Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of 
the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wise. L. REv. 950, 953. In 
effect, miscalculation is one of many factors that prevent allocative efficiency. The most 
common cause is variations in the competitiveness of input markets. For an example, see 
HARRISON, supra note 48, at 32-35. Nevertheless, even if all other factors were consistent 
with allocative efficiency, damage inaccuracies would prevent it from being obtained. 
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the cost of that breach to the Peevyhouses. Again the same incorrect signal 
with respect to Garland's cost of production is sent to downstream markets. 
Garland Coal pays $300 for an activity (or lack thereof) that is worth 
$15,000. The savings are reflected in pricing and again the wrong signal is 
sent to purchasers. 
As a final possibility, consider the case when expectancy damages are 
set at a level higher than necessary to compensate. In effect, the price paid 
for the breach exceeds the cost to the non-breaching party. In this case, the 
Peevyhouses may feel only $15,000 worse off with unrestored land, the cost 
of restoration is $29,000 and their recovery is $20,000. A breach may still 
occur, and it is hardly a false positive since the price of the breach exceeds 
the cost. On the other hand, the label "false negative" is also not quite accu-
rate since Garland Coal will still find it in its interest to breach. Neverthe-
less, the misallocations at the downstream level still occur. The breaching 
party pays more for the "input," which is, of course, the breach. Prices in-
crease in the downstream market and output declines. Again, when faced 
with higher prices, buyers may shift to other producers. It is possible these 
producers are less efficient than the higher-priced supplier who has paid 
supracompensatory damages. 115 
G. Summary 
In 1981, just after full development of the concept of the efficient 
breach, 116 Ian Macneil wrote his powerful article, Efficiency Breach of Con-
tract: Circles in the Sky. 117 While his reasoning does not quite support his 
arguments that the efficient breach is a "fallacy,"118 the notion of "circles in 
the sky" seems appropriate. 119 Could a breach occur that results in an effi-
cient outcome? The answer appears to be yes, but there are so many contin-
gencies that it almost certainly is a rare occurrence and coincidence more 
than a rational application of a system of remedies. Indeed, it is not clear 
that anyone could actually identify when the efficient breach has occurred. 
Moreover, even if the breach is efficient, the cost (damages) may be in cor-
115. This does not exhaust the ways of criticizing expectancy as a means of encour-
aging the efficient breach. Richard Craswell was perhaps the first and most thorough scholar 
to list the number of practical hurdles between efficiency and expectancy. See Craswell, 
supra note 30, at 661-65. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6, II. 
117. See generally Macneil, supra note II. See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying 
text. 
118. See Macneil, supra note II, at 950-53. The fallacy to which Professor Macneil is 
referring is not clear. It may have been more appropriate to refer to it as "the fallacy of ex-
pectancy." 
119. !d. at 947. 
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rect. 120 An incorrect amount is internalized and downstream inefficiencies 
occur. 121 
Ill. THE EXPECTANCY/SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE/LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES/PUNITIVE DAMAGES DISCUSSION 
The focus of this Part is specific performance and its surrogates. A 
discussion of specific performance invariably also includes additional dis-
cussion of expectancy. The two topics cannot be separated as neatly as the 
heading may suggest. The first two Sections introduce the complexity of 
attempting to support either expectancy or specific performance as superior 
as the means to the end of the efficient breach. 122 The next two Sections 
return to the use of the contract curve to demonstrate why specific perfor-
mance is not, and probably cannot be, viewed as the superior alternative. 123 
As noted in the Introduction, one aspect of the efficient breach debate 
is whether specific performance or expectancy damages are more consistent 
with the efficient breach. 124 Although impossible to quantify, it appears as a 
general matter that, at least among scholars, specific performance is increas-
ingly favored. 125 But this is fluid. One important work seems to argue in 
favor of specific performance "sometimes."126 Another leading strong pro-
ponent of specific performance has recently signaled at least some doubts. 127 
A. Specific Performance and Expectancy 
Foremost among those who initially questioned expectancy as leading 
to efficient breach were Professors Peter Linzer, Ian Macneil, and Daniel 
Farber. 128 Professor Linzer, commenting on the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts and the amoral nature of contract law, pointed out that the effi-
cient breach was seriously flawed when subjective values were at stake. 129 
Professor Macneil's criticism is broader, harsher, and worthy of a close 
120. See supra Section II.B-F. 
121. See supra Section II.F. 
122. See infra Section III.A-B. 
123. See infra Section III.C-D. 
124. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. To be accurate, the general issue 
of the efficient breach has also included discussion of liquidated damages and punitive dam-
ages. See Dodge, supra note 1, at 683-85; Goetz & Scott, supra note 8, at 558-62. 
125. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, I 03 
HARV. L. REV. 688 (1990); FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 746-74. 
126. See Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note I, at I 029. 
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
129. Linzer, supra note 11, at 111-12, 118-25. 
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look. 13° Farber catalogues the multitude of ways expectancy can fail to be 
compensatory and, consequently, is inconsistent with the efficient breach. 131 
More specifically, if expectancy were the rule, there are many reasons to 
believe that breach would take place at inefficiently high levels. 132 The focus 
immediately below is on Professor Macneil's effort because he was among 
the first to begin the process of measuring expectancy alongside specific 
performance. 133 His analysis did not, for the most part, quibble with whether 
expectancy could be linked to efficiency. It is much more an argument 
about which remedy is more likely to be consistent with efficiency. 134 
Professor Macneil worked from a hypothetical first introduced by Pro-
fessor Linzer in which a party who is contractually obligated to make chairs 
is offered a far more lucrative opportunity to switch to the manufacture of 
tables. 135 The efficient outcome would be to switch to the production of ta-
bles. 136 Macneil observed, "The assumption that it is economically efficient . 
. . to build tables rather than chairs by no means leads to the conclusion that 
breach is the economically efficient result." 137 In what now seems like a 
simple observation, Professor Macneil noted that efficiency did not depend 
on breach but on the redirection of productive capacity. 138 This redirection 
could be reached without breach and without expectancy damages. 139 For 
example, assume the default remedy in the case of breach of contract is spe-
cific performance and return to the hypothetical of Jane, Todd, Felix, and 
the red Honda. After receiving the offer from Felix and understanding the 
outcome if she did breach, one would expect Jane to approach Todd and 
offer him part of the profit from the breach in order to be relieved of the 
obligation to deliver the car. According to Professor Macneil, there is no 
particular efficiency advantage of one rule over the other as long as there 
are no transaction costs. 140 When there are transaction costs, this conclusion 
changes and one rule will more readily lead to more efficient outcomes. 141 
But, he emphasizes, this is a different matter than the substance of the rule 
130. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 11, at 950. Professor Macneil's arguments are 
presented in unusually direct language. /d. It represents the disdain with which many conven-
tional scholars regarded economic analysis at that time. 
131. Farber, supra note 1, at 1448-68, 1476. 
132. /d. Another way to state this is that expectancy does not result in the full inter-
nalization of the harm caused. 
133. See sources cited supra note II. 
134. See Macneil, supra note II, at 949-50. 
135. See Macneil, supra note II, at 948 (citing Linzer, supra note II, at 114-15). 
136. /d. at 950. 
137. /d. 
138. /d. at950-51. 
139. /d. 
140. /d. at 951-53. 
141. /d. at 954-60. 
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itself. 142 The determining factor is which rule in any particular circumstance 
results in lower transaction costs. 143 
Although the transaction cost analysis is correct in theory, it can be 
broken down to a more specific analysis focusing on the most likely types 
of disagreements that can occur even when a jurisdiction has a firm rule 
about the applicable remedy. Under this more refined analysis it appears, as 
far as transaction costs, expectancy may have the edge. 144 A place to start in 
order to understand this is a jurisdiction in which there is an ironclad expec-
tancy rule and both parties know that and do not disagree about the amount 
of damages. In this case, the transaction costs will be very low. The breach-
ing party will write a check and transaction costs will only involve the non-
breaching party's efforts to enter into a covering transaction. In the same set 
of circumstances, suppose the ironclad remedy is specific performance. 
Now there must be a negotiation between the parties for the redirection of 
resources to occur. Owing to the bilateral nature of their relationship, the 
negotiation may be prolonged and the amount determined may or may not 
equal actual damages. In this case, it seems almost certain that the transac-
tion cost analysis favors expectancy. 
Moving from the simplest point, suppose the parties in the ironclad 
expectancy jurisdiction are exactly like they were above except there is a 
142. /d. at 956. 
143. Professor Macneil argues that the appropriate statement of the rule pertaining to 
efficient breach is as follows: 
Whether an expectation damages rule or a specific performance rule is more effi-
cient depends entirely upon the relative transaction costs of operating under the 
rules. Where, as will most generally be the case, transaction costs under either rule 
will exceed gross efficiency gains made possible by scrapping one contract in favor 
of another, each rule is equally (in)efficient. Where both rules will permit substitut-
ing a more productive contract for a less productive contract, the difference in effi-
ciency of the rules will be measured exactly by the difference in their respective 
transaction costs. Where one rule will permit substitution and the other will not, the 
difference in efficiency will be measured by the difference in respective transaction 
costs, but subject to an upper limit consisting of the hypothetical net efficiency 
gain under the rule with the lower transaction costs. None of the transaction costs 
can be deduced by use of the microeconomic model, but can only be determined 
inductively from empirical evidence. 
/d. at 957. It seems likely that Professor Macneil was not arguing for changing the "rule" in 
the case of each contract depending on the transaction costs. That would mean proceeding 
through litigation, which would almost certainly mean transaction costs would eliminate any 
gain associated with a breach. See Farber, supra note 1, at 1444. One reason this is unclear 
relates to the second sentence of the statement. Macneil, supra note 11, at 957. This is con-
sistent with some of the examples he offers. He also lists as a cost the impact of breach on 
the reputation of the breaching party. /d. at 954-58. This also suggests some finding of 
wrongdoing. 
144. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1944-45. Of course, this assumes 
that either remedy will mean full internalization, which, as explained, is not the case. /d. at 
1992-93. 
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disagreement about the amount of damages. This means there will be a ne-
gotiation, litigation, or both. The likelihood of an efficient breach declines 
because of these extra costs. 145 For example, the potentially breaching party 
will realize that there are costs beyond just writing the check. On the other 
hand, in the ironclad specific performance context, there will be no quibble 
over the damages, but the negotiation about the price of a release from the 
performance will be similar to that described above. Here again, there does 
not seem to be a transaction cost advantage to specific performance. 
Third, this time the same parties disagree about whether there is a 
breach at all. In both jurisdictions, the parties will incur significant transac-
tion costs. On the other hand, once liability and damages are determined 
under expectancy, a check is written. In the specific performance context, 
however, even after liability is determined, the costs of renegotiation are 
still to be incurred. And, as in the other examples, the process of bargaining 
around the order of specific performance may be costly and prolonged. 
In short, at least from a general perspective and without empirical evi-
dence, it appears that expectancy would be the lower transaction cost alter-
native in most instances. On the other hand, as described above and later, 
lower transaction costs do not assure an efficient breach when expectancy is 
the applicable remedy. 146 This leads to the question, addressed in the next 
section, of whether specific performance is superior in reaching the effi-
ciency breach even though it may be the more costly remedy in terms of 
transaction costs. Transaction costs may block the efficient breach, but their 
absence does nothing to offset the inherent problems discussed in Section C. 
First, however, it is useful to consider another of Professor Macneil's 
concerns which was the lack of attention by those then applying law and 
economics to the determination of the initial allocation of rights. 147 To un-
derstand why this is important, it is useful to recall the difference between 
liability rules and property rules. 148 Under a liability rule, examples of which 
are expectancy damages and recoveries based on torts, the remedy is com-
pensation. 149 In torts, the remedy brings the party back to the position he 
was in before the damages. In contracts, the theory is that the injured party 
145. See Farber, supra note I, at 1444. Other things change here as well. Both parties 
are now bargaining about an expected loss or gain, and their tolerance for risk will affect the 
likelihood of settlement. 
146. See supra Section II.C. 
147. Professor Macneil mistakenly asserts that there is no efficiency standard applied 
to initial allocations and that they just exist and are viewed as neutral. Macneil, supra note 
II, at 950-53. This is not completely accurate. An initial allocation can be Pareto optimal if 
there are no redistributions that would make at least one person better off while not making 
anyone worse off. Harrison, supra note 61, at 2 n.l2; Macneil, supra note II, at 953. 
148. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106-10 (1972). 
149. See id. 
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is put in the position he would have been had there not been a breach. Under 
a property rule, on the other hand, the rights may not be violated without 
permission. This distinction makes sense. In some cases, transaction costs 
are too high to expect the parties to meet and agree. 150 In those instances, the 
idea of permission is irrelevant, but there still must be payment in order to 
assure the party responsible for the externality internalizes the cost of his 
activity. When transaction costs are low, there is no good reason to allow 
one party to take the property of another without permission. 151 They can 
negotiate, and as will be discussed later, 152 there is no reason to expect the 
injured party to be undercompensated. 
In the auto case, suppose one hour after delivering the car, Felix calls 
Jane with the offer of $8,000. What should she do? She could attempt to 
buy the car back from Todd, or if she kept a spare set of keys, she could 
take the car and leave Todd $6,500. Do we want her to do this?153 Maybe so. 
After all, under the efficient breach theory, there is little to distinguish "theft 
with payment" from "breach with payment." 154 In each case, there is an ab-
sence of consent. And each option avoids the transaction costs of a renego-
tiation, during which Todd might ask inconvenient questions like, "Why do 
you want the car back?" Nevertheless, the only thing Jane can lawfully do is 
similar to specific performance. Jane must negotiate in order to "undo" the 
contract. 
Now move the timing back a little, and she is approaching Todd's 
house where she is to deliver the car. Just before arriving, she receives the 
call from Felix. Now a liability rule is likely to apply, and Jane can give 
Todd the check and resell to Felix. In effect, the transaction costs of non-
performance depends on a contrived notion of when Todd comes to "own" 
the car. The problem, according to Professor Macneil, is that the idea of 
how to defme when something is officially someone's property does not 
have an economic rationale but actually leads to remedies about which vari-
150. See Farber, supra note 1, at 1444. The transaction cost analysis would tend to 
favor a property rule or specific performance in contracts cases. See Kronman, supra note 13, 
at 363-64. 
151. Actually one justification is the avoidance of bilateral monopoly. Bilateral mo-
nopoly exists when there is one seller for which there are no good substitutes (a monopoly) 
and a single potential buyer (monopsony). Since neither party has an option and each knows 
that, there may be a risk of an impasse and no sale. This can be regarded as a type of transac-
tion cost. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 148. 
152. See infra Section III.C. 
153. This would involve shifting a property rule to a liability rule and is one explana-
tion for criminal law. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 148, at 1126. The difference is that 
the liability rule requires no consent, but the property rule does. !d. at 1126-27. This seems to 
beg the issue of why it is necessary to have a property rule if compensation takes place. One 
answer, as suggested in the text, is that property rules are superior at ensuring the "injured" 
party is not made worse off. !d. at 1125-26. 
154. See id. at 1124-27. 
194 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
ous economic rationales are applied. 155 After all, ownership could be defined 
as attaching anytime from when the contract is signed to after Todd has put 
1,000 miles on the odometer. This may seem fanciful, but it is actually con-
sistent with things such as '"cooling-off periods" 156 as well as sections of 
the Uniform Commercial Code 157 and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 158 which actually defme when, in effect, a buyer acquires a property 
right. 
One does not have the impression that Professor Macneil would have 
embraced the concept of the efficient breach even if these hurdles could be 
addressed. On the other hand, implicit in his analysis is the moral ac-
ceptance of an efficiency standard in contracts. Moreover, his claim that the 
efficient breach is a fallacy is a bit overstated. Or, more specifically, it does 
not necessarily follow from his criticism. Indeed, it may be unfair to law 
and economics scholars to view them as wedded to one remedy or another. 
They have disagreed over the means to the end of the efficient breach, but 
they seem united in viewing the efficient breach as a goal. Nevertheless, 
Professor Macneil pointed out for the first time that the superiority of ex-
pectancy over specific performance was far from a forgone conclusion and 
that the superiority of one rule over another was a function of context. 159 
B. In Favor of Specific Performance 
The debate about expectancy and specific performance has taken a 
number of forms. Anthony Kronman appears to be the first to have noted 
that low transaction costs in the contracts setting would tend to favor reli-
ance on specific performance. 160 His preference for specific performance has 
been echoed by a number of writers, perhaps most notably Alan 
Schwartz. 161 In his 1979 effort in favor of specific performance, Schwartz 
cited the superiority of specific performance in terms of achieving the com-
pensation goal. 162 He also argued against the rationales presented in favor of 
155. Macneil, supra note 11, at 963-65. 
156. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED 
DECISIONS 24 (1998). Possibly the best known '"cooling-off' period" is that applied by the 
Federal Trade Commission to door-to-door sales. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (2012). It allows 
consumers to change their minds within three days. /d. 
157. See U.C.C. § 2-503 (2012). 
158. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presenta-
tion, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974). 
159. Macneil, supra note 11, at 957. 
160. Kronman, supra note 13, at 368. 
161. See generally Schwartz, supra note 16. 
162. /d. at 274. It is not clear that Schwartz is equating the compensation goal with 
the goal of internalizing at efficient levels. It is possible to achieve the first outcome without 
the second. 
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damages over specific performance. 163 In 1990, he returned indirectly to the 
topic by noting the similarity of specific performance to penalty clauses and 
making the point that whatever preference parties have for specific perfor-
mance is not based on the desire for supracompensatory damages. 164 In the 
case law, perhaps the most well-known economic support for specific per-
formance is found in Judge Posner's opinion in Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek 
Property Co. 165 In that case, Walgreen, a shopping center tenant, sued Sarah 
Creek for violating a condition in its lease that guaranteed there would be no 
other drug stores in the center. 166 In his opinion favoring the grant of a per-
manent injunction, Posner noted two advantages of the injunction over an 
award of damages: 
First, it shifts the burden of determining the cost of the defendant's conduct from 
the court to the parties. If it is true that Walgreen's damages are smaller than the 
gain to Sara Creek from allowing a second pharmacy into the shopping mall, then 
there must be a price for dissolving the injunction that will make both parties better 
off. Thus, the effect of upholding the injunction would be to substitute for the cost-
ly processes of forensic fact determination the less costly processes of private ne-
gotiation. Second, a premise of our free-market system, and the lesson of experi-
ence here and abroad as well, is that prices and costs are more accurately deter-
mined by the market than by government. A battle of experts is a less reliable 
method of determining the actual cost to Walgreen of facing new competition than 
negotiations between Walgreen and Sara Creek over the price at which Walgreen 
would feel adequately compensated for having to face that competition. 167 
In this passage, Posner concedes that expectancy damages may or may 
not result in the proper level of internalization. 168 He also notes that the price 
paid by Sara Creek will be determined by the parties, and thus, compensa-
tion of the non-breaching party is assured. 169 
The process and the superiority of specific performance in this regard 
can be understood by reference again to the contract curve. 170 Now the con-
tract curve extends from the lowest amount that Walgreen will accept to 
release Sara Creek from its obligation to the most Sara Creek will pay for 
that right. The most Sara Creek will pay is the profit 171 to be made by leas-
ing to a competitor of Walgreen. The least Walgreen will take is the profit it 
163. See generally id. 
164. Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: 
An Analysis of Contracting/or Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 370 (1990). 
165. 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992). 
166. /d. at 274. 
167. /d. at 275-76. 
168. See id. 
169. Seeid. 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. 
171. Sara Creek may also deduct from this any harm to its reputation or other costs of 
having appeared to breach, but most of these would have been sunk costs in the time frame 
of the case. 
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estimates it will lose if the competitor is present. The profit lost by 
Walgreen is the actual harm caused and should be internalized. There is no 
reason to think this would be acceptable to Walgreen given it now possesses 
the right to force performance. In fact, it is now a monopoly seller of the 
right of Sara Creek to lease to a competitor. Efficient non-performance will 
not occur unless Walgreen is fully compensated and Sara Creek internalizes 
the harm. On the other hand, as will be seen, non-performance may also 
occur if internalization is supracompensatory, and if so, specific perfor-
mance will fail to carry through on its promise of efficiency. 
Another point made by those favoring specific performance is that 
there is evidence that contracting parties actually prefer specific perfor-
mance. 172 This is difficult to determine because in many instances that pref-
erence may not be obvious due to the fact that courts are unwilling to grant 
specific performance, and the litigants know it. 173 Nevertheless, Steven 
Shavell has argued that at least some evidence exists that specific perfor-
mance is the preferred remedy. 174 More importantly, a series of empirical 
studies reported on and conducted by Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David 
Hoffman provide additional support for a preference for specific perfor-
mance.175 This is not surprising. Routine availability of specific performance 
means the worst-case scenario for the non-breaching party will be full com-
pensation while, in the case of expectancy, it is merely a possibility. There 
is some danger of making too much of these studies due to methodological 
limitations. For the most part, the studies suggest to the subject that he or 
she is in the role of the non-breaching party after the hypothetical breach 
occurs. 176 They do not seem to ask what the preferred remedy would be if 
the subject of the survey were the breaching party. In effect, subjects likely 
are affected by something akin to the endowment effect in that they are con-
scious of their own position. A better measure could be to pose the same 
questions to subjects who are behind a version of the "veil ofignorance." 177 
Putting these possible problems aside, the theory for why there is a 
preference for specific performance makes sense. According to Wilkinson-
Ryan & Hoffman damages do not adequately address the "psychology of .. 
. breach."178 This factor is distinguishable from the fact that expectancy 
damages do not protect the subjective and monetized valuations placed on 
172. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of 
Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 TEx. L. REv. 831, 875-76 (2006). 
173. See id. at 875. 
174. !d. at 875-76. 
175. See generally Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 17. 
176. !d. at 1014, 1025. 
177. The veil of ignorance, as those familiar with the writings of John Rawls will 
recognize, prevents the parties from knowing how a rule will affect them personally. See 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999). 
178. Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1014. 
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performance by non-breaching parties. Instead, these studies indicate that 
there is a sense of injury by virtue of the broken promise. 179 For example, in 
one instance non-breaching parties reported, on average, that payment of 
2.19 times expectancy should be paid, and if faced with a choice, they pre-
ferred specific performance by a large margin. 180 Breach for the most part 
was regarded as immoral. 181 Blended in with these emotions appears to be a 
sense of having been exploited when a contract is breached. 182 
Precisely what is going on in these instances and the reaction, if any, 
by contract law, is difficult to determine with certainty. It goes without say-
ing that the negative reaction to damages as opposed to specific perfor-
mance is a function of expectations or a sense of entitlement to perfor-
mance.183 Suppose the same subjects had taken a course on how the system 
actually works and knew that expectancy is the norm. There is some possi-
bility, at least, that their sense of injustice would soften. In short, the prob-
lem may lie less in contract law than it does in the misinformation provided 
by a superficial understanding of the law. 184 
In addition, some of the objections to damages seem to be fueled by 
the sense of not having been treated fairly. 185 In those instances, higher 
damage awards may well solve the problem. 186 In these cases, it becomes 
difficult to separate undercompensation from a more deontological-based 
sense of wrong. 187 In fact, the latter possibility is supported by the desire of 
non-breaching parties to punish those who have breached even when there 
is no personal gain. 188 There are two important implications of these studies. 
One is that they seem to support specific performance. 189 Second, any mod-
em discussions of compensatory and expectancy damages that do not ac-
count for those phenomena are incomplete. 
A final argument in favor of specific performance is largely non-
economic in any technical sense. Returning to Sara Creek and Walgreen, 
think again about the contract curve and suppose Walgreen's loss from the 
presence of a competitor is $10,000 and Sara Creek's gain is $20,000. In the 
world of efficient breach, Walgreen would receive $10,000 and be indiffer-
179. Seeid. 
180. /d. 
181. See id. Again, the juxtaposition of moral decision with payments that will restore 
a sense of morality is problematic. See supra Section II.D. 
182. Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1017. 
183. Harrison, supra note 79, at 446. 
184. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1015. 
185. /d. at 1028-31. Of course, there are many determinants of the development of a 
sense of unfairness. See generally Harrison, supra note 79. 
186. Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1025-27. 
187. See id. at 1014, 1016. 
188. /d. at 1034. 
189. /d.at1014. 
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ent to receiving a check or being the sole drugstore in the shopping center. 
Specific performance means that Sara Creek will be required to share part 
of the gain created by the breach. This idea of sharing has appeal, and it 
seems likely that it is fueled by the sense that Walgreen was a victim and 
Sarah Creek was the more powerful party. Even if this were the case, most 
economists, in their role as economists, would say they cannot support the 
redistribution argument because it involves an interpersonal comparison of 
utility. That is probably true, but there may be a better reason for not auto-
matically favoring sharing. The instinct to favor sharing assumes the 
breaching party is almost invariably the weaker and poorer party. There 
appears to be no basis for this supposition. Indeed, how many would favor 
the sharing solution if the breaching party were Bill Gates' gardener? For 
example, let's say the gardener is paid $100 to mow the Gates' yard. Anoth-
er customer then offers the gardener $200. Are we inclined to order specific 
performance to ensure that Gates gets part of the profit from the breach? 
Probably not. In reality, we cannot know when the distributive effects of 
specific performance will be pleasing to our sense of justice. 
C. The Failure of Specific Performance 
In order to understand the ultimate failure of specific performance, it 
is useful to return to the modified version of the Peevy house case. 190 A close 
look reveals the efficiency of specific performance, on the one hand, and the 
source of an almost assured inefficiency on the other. Garland Coal pur-
chased the rights to strip mine land owned by the Peevyhouses. 191 Part of the 
consideration was to restore the land to its original condition. Garland Coal 
breached this part of the contract, and the Peevyhouses sued for damages. 192 
Actually performing the restoration would cost $29,000. 193 Aside from 
showing that expectancy can be measured in more than one way, 194 the case 
seems to illustrate a situation in which specific performance is the appropri-
ate remedy if the goal is for Garland Coal to internalize the harm to the 
Peevyhouses of the breach. In Judge Posner's Sara Creek language, "prices 
and costs are more accurately determined by the market than by govern-
ment."195 If Judge Posner means that parties, aided by the market, can more 
efficiently determine a price, he is correct. If he is suggesting that the par-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46. 
191. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, Ill (Okla. 1963). 
192. !d. In the case, as opposed to the modified version presented here, actual damag-
es were calculated at $300. !d. at 114. 
193. /d.atlll. 
194. The case is typically used to illustrate the question of whether cost of perfor-
mance or diminution of value should be awarded. /d. 
195. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992); 
see also supra text accompanying note 167. 
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ties in a bilateral monopoly are comparable to a "market," he is obviously 
incorrect. More specifically, it is incorrect if he is suggesting the price de-
termined is a measure of the harm caused. 
One can understand this by considering the Peevyhouses after they 
have been granted specific performance. Someone from Garland Coal calls 
to inquire about how much it will cost to buy the right not to restore the 
land. Any price lower than $29,000 would make Garland Coal better off. 
The Peevyhouses may very well stick to a price in excess of that amount. If 
so, Garland Coal will restore the land, and the outcome will be efficient. In 
fact, insistence on restoration indicates the breach was not efficient since the 
harm to the Peevyhouses exceeds the gain to Garland Coal of not perform-
mg. 
On the other hand, the Peevyhouses may be willing to take an amount 
less than $29,000 because they are actually indifferent between having the 
land restored and receiving $15,000. In this case, the breach is efficient and 
the amount to be internalized by Garland Coal would be $15,000. But why 
settle for $15,000? It is the lowest point on the contract curve, and now the 
Peevyhouses have monopoly power. Why would they follow a rule any 
different from that followed by any monopolist and not charge what the 
market will bear? The only leverage Garland Coal has is it can threaten to 
restore the land. And, oddly, this is the same leverage the Peevyhouses 
have-it can force Garland Coal to restore the land. We have a contract 
curve ranging from $15,000 to $29,000. Any amount between those ex-
tremes means both parties are better off if the land is not restored. Unless 
bilateral monopoly problems get in the way, Garland Coal will buy the right 
for an amount between $15,000 and $29,000. This will be efficient in the 
sense that the resources that would have been used to restore the land will 
be redirected to some other uses. Moreover, the outcome is attractive to 
many because it protects the Peevyhouses from a monetary award that 
would not have been compensatory and would have meant a gross under 
internalization by the Peevyhouses. In effect, specific performance ensures 
that the breach does not occur unless it is efficient. A slightly more tech-
nical way to state this is that under specific performance, the non-breaching 
party will have a reservation price (the least it will take) that is no less than 
the actual harm suffered. 196 
This appears to be a good outcome all around. There are, however, 
two problems. One could be viewed as relatively minor and the other per-
haps pervasive. If a jurisdiction adopts specific performance as a default 
rule, there will almost certainly be negotiation about the price to the breach-
196. Judge Posner has noted the attractiveness of specific performance because it 
shifts the task of determining damages from the court to the parties. Sara Creek, 966 F.2d at 
275. Whether this actually lowers the costs of the determination is a different question. 
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ing party of avoiding performance. 197 In the example here, the parties will 
have to select a price between $15,000 and $29,000, which means there will 
be transaction costs. As transaction costs increase, the probably that Garland 
Coal will actual buy the right to take the efficient course and not perform 
declines. In short, specific performance will protect the Peevyhouses from 
an inefficient breach, but high transactions costs may prevent efficient non-
performance from occurring. This basic theory applies, perhaps to a lesser 
extent, to liquidated damages and punitive damages as well. For example, 
suppose the Peevyhouses had a punitive damages clause that called for a 
$50,000 payment if the land was not restored. If the Peevyhouses insist on 
the $29,000, Garland Coal's leverage is to restore the land, which, as in the 
hypothetical, is only worth $15,000 to the Peevyhouses. At any price above 
$15,000 they would be better off, and if they understand the situation, they 
will negotiate and ultimately agree to sell their right to liquidated damages 
for something between $15,000 and $29,000. In this case, liquidated dam-
ages would not prevent efficient non-performance but would make it more 
expensive to achieve. 198 
Arguments that punitive damages for breach of contract would impede 
efficient non-performance follow this pattern. For example, consider again 
the Peevyhouses, and suppose Oklahoma, the state in which the case arose, 
had a law that said, "Any party breaching a contract with respect to the res-
toration of land will be liable for damages plus $100,000." Now Garland 
Coal once again decides it would prefer not to restore the land. The 
Peevyhouses know about the $100,000 and may feel they have Garland 
Coal in a bind. Garland Coal's way out of the bind is to pay the Peevyhous-
es. Again, they are willing to pay up to $29,000 because if the Peevyhouses 
demand more, Garland Coal will restore the land. And again, the 
Peevyhouses are better off with anything over $15,000. The same negotia-
tion between $15,000 and $29,000 will occur. 199 In effect, any remedy that 
forces Garland Coal to bargain with the non-breaching party may result in 
higher transaction costs, but it also means increasing, over expectancy, the 
probability that, when non-performance does take place, it will be consistent 
with an efficient redirection of resources. 200 
In sum, at least to this point, assuming the law is clear, expectancy 
probably means lower transaction costs but a lower probability of the proper 
197. If there is uncertainty and the remedy is damages, the post-decision transaction 
costs are lower than if specific performance is granted. 
198. Interestingly, the similarity of liquidated damages to specific performance was 
missed by some of those first writing about the topic including, it appears, both Professor 
Linzer and Judge Posner. See Linzer, supra note II, at 115; Lake River Corp. v. Carborun-
dum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985). 
199. Regardless of the rule applied, Garland has a buyout point of$29,000. 
200. This analysis changes when the costs of Garland Coal unexpectedly increase. 
See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text; see also supra Section III.C. 
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level of internalization. This means a higher risk of false positives. Specific 
performance is likely to be more expensive transaction cost-wise but, unless 
these costs are excessive, it is more likely to result in efficient non-
performance. When transactions costs are high there is a danger of false 
negatives. Unfortunately, it is not that simple, and the second problem is a 
more senous one. 
D. False Positives, False Negatives, and Downstream Effects 
The possibility of false positives, false negatives, and downstream ef-
fects of expectancy were noted above. 201 The same analysis can be applied 
to specific performance but with outcomes that are more predictable. Yet 
again return to the Peevyhouse case but suppose the jurisdiction is one that 
will order specific performance or one of the surrogates-liquidated damag-
es or punitive damages. As noted above, the contract curve will extend from 
$15,000, the least the Peevyhouses will accept, to $29,000, the most Gar-
land Coal will agree to pay. The least the Peevyhouses would take is the 
amount that would leave them indifferent between the payment and the res-
toration of the land. It fully includes any subjective valuation and even 
"moral" judgments they may have about breach. The problem is that this 
fully compensatory amount is just the starting point for the negotiation. 202 In 
the case of the sale of an already existing car by a non-producer-the Honda 
hypothetical above-this may be no more than a distributive matter. 203 
On the other hand, something more than a distributive issue arises 
when, as in the Peevyhouse case, the party internalizing the harm is an on-
going business. Given that they hold the trump card for requiring Garland 
Coal to spend $29,000, the Peevyhouses need not accept their indifference 
amount. So, let's suppose they bargain to a settlement of $20,000. This is 
$5,000 in excess of any possible measure of actual harm. More importantly, 
we have an ongoing business--Garland Coal-internalizing a cost in an 
amount that is in excess of the amount that would fully compensate the 
"seller" for the right not to perform. The downstream market is affected in 
the same way as overcompensation in the context of damages. 
The downstream impact of specific performance becomes more pro-
nounced if the numbers are altered a bit. Suppose the Peevyhouses and Gar-
land Coal are generally in agreement that specific performance will be the 
201. See supra Section II.F. 
202. This too may be of little consequence in cases in which the breaching party is 
viewed as simply being required to share part of the profit from the breach with the non-
breaching party. The usual argument here is that it is merely a distributive issue and econom-
ics is unable to evaluate the social welfare effects. 
203. Steven Shavell has also distinguished between goods that exist and those to be 
produced in order to make a somewhat different point. See Shavell, supra note 172, at 875-
76. 
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default remedy. Suppose, however, that it turns out that the restoration 
would cost $70,000, not the $29,000 that was expected. At that price, Gar-
land Coal will have an incentive to breach. Now, however, the leverage of 
perfonning at $29,000 is lost. The contract curve now stretches from 
$15,000 to $70,000. Whatever the settlement price, it will be in excess of 
the actual hann and the predictable downstream effect may occur. 
A default rule of specific performance creates a powerful risk of over-
internalization. Is there a way to control this persistent over-internalization? 
One way is to leave it unclear when specific performance will be required. 
This means if the Peevyhouses turn out to be hard bargainers, there will be 
litigation with the outcome that they will end up with $300, the decrease in 
the value of the land. On the other hand, the analysis above illustrates that 
moving back to damages just means incurring the risks of under- or over-
compensation as well as false positives. 
Another possibility is to couple a policy of routine specific perfor-
mance with a relatively liberal approach to excuse for non-performance. It 
is possible that the threat of a court actually excusing the performance of 
Garland Coal does increase the leverage of Garland Coal in bargaining with 
the Peevyhouses. In fact, a case can be made that any pronounced shift to 
specific performance as a default rule should be accompanied by a relatively 
liberal approach to various excuses for non-performance. 
Note that specific performance will not create a risk of false positives. 
Since the non-breaching party is in control of whether non-performance will 
be permitted, they will almost certainly avoid this problem. False negatives 
are possible, however, when the non-breaching party attempts to exploit its 
position. For example, in the original example, the value of performance to 
the Peevyhouses is $15,000, but the contract curve extends all the way to 
$29,000. This may encourage the Peevyhouses to stick to a price in excess 
of $29,000 with the result being that the land is restored. This is a false neg-
ative. This sort of impasse is viewed as a risk of bilateral monopoly, alt-
hough the incidence of impasse is not clear given that both parties are worse 
off. 
If there are no false positives and limited false negatives, can one say 
specific performance encourages efficient non-performance? The answer is 
yes, but this is a very shallow notion of efficiency. The parties to the con-
tract are better off if the outcome is non-performance. The price charged by 
the non-breaching party for the right not to perform will reflect the market 
power of the selling party and will be in excess of a compensatory amount. 
This in turn is passed down to buyers in the market in which the non-
performing party operates. As noted above, these passed-on costs in excess 
of actual hann promote inefficiencies in the downstream market by over-
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stating actual costs of production. 204 Consequently, adherence to a rule that 
seems to increase the likelihood of an efficient outcome between the parties 
actually sets into motion the source of another inefficiency. 
Although the final outcome is an empirical question, the two remedies 
can be compared. As a general matter, expectancy is more likely to result in 
false positives as far as identifying efficient breaches, and this translates to 
inefficiently low prices and high levels of output in downstream markets. 
One might argue the chances of false positives and false negatives are ran-
dom and there is no reason to believe one would occur more than the other. 
This seems unlikely, but even if it were the case, there is no offsetting im-
pact in downstream markets because it is unlikely if not impossible that the 
same firm will be affected by offsetting levels of over- and under-
compensation. On the other hand, due to transaction costs, including those 
created by bilateral monopoly, specific performance may lead to false nega-
tives. More importantly, even when there is no false negative and the breach 
(non-performance) occurs, a consistent consequence would be the internal-
izing of costs in excess of harm with the result being reflected in artificially 
high costs in the output market. 205 
IV. A NEW DEFENSE OF EXPECTANCY: AN INCOMPLETE ARGUMENT 
The argument thus far is that comparisons of expectancy and specific 
performance, as far as efficiency is concerned, make for a moderately inter-
esting academic discussion but are of little use. Recently, however, two 
Yale professors published in the Virginia Law Review in an effort to revive 
204. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
205. It may appear that a solution to uncertainty and transaction costs would be for 
the parties to consistently insert a liquidated damages clause in their contracts that reflects a 
prenegotiated "buy out" price. For example, suppose a jurisdiction required the inclusion of 
liquidated damages clauses. In the Peevyhouse case, suppose the contract required restoration 
of the land but included a clause indicating that, if the land were not restored, Garland Coal 
would pay the Peevyhouses $15,000---the compensatory amount. The idea would be to set 
the price for an efficient breach ahead of time and before a bilateral monopoly is created. On 
balance, this is not a very practical solution. First, an allowance for liquidated damages is 
itself just a contract term. Required inclusion raises transaction costs of the initial contract. In 
effect, a new type of false negative comes into play in the sense that otherwise efficiency-
producing contracts would not be formed due to the increased transaction costs of negotiat-
ing the original contract. Second, if actual damages turned out to be substantially lower, one 
side would almost certainly claim it was a penalty. If damages were substantially higher, the 
figure would lead to the risk of false positives. Third, even though liquidated damages claus-
es ideally are set at amounts equal to "anticipated or actual harm," in fact, they perform other 
functions that may cause them to deviate from expected harm. See POSNER, 7th edition, supra 
note 8, at 127-29. Finally, as a negotiated term of the contract, parties would likely agree to 
different amounts for the very same harm depending on concessions made with respect to 
other terms of the contract. 
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expectancy.206 Markovits and Schwartz, in nearly impenetrable language 
rendering it likely to be of interest to a narrower than usual population of 
law professors, largely reframe arguments made in the past. In the process, 
for an unexplained reason, they ignore thirty years of research on rationality 
and decision-making, seem to become unglued from the original question of 
how to assure the efficient breach, and rely on justifications that should be 
discarded. 207 
The Markovits and Schwartz purport to present an argument against 
what they view as the conventional view that "[a] promisee . . . intends to 
contract for goods or services; he does not intend to sell an option that per-
mits the promisor either to trade or to pay."208 The authors respond to this· 
argument with one that says, in effect, that a contracting party would not 
care whether there is performance or payment. 209 Their argument is that 
there really is no difference in outcome to non-breaching parties under spe-
cific performance (a property rule) and expectancy (a liability rule). 210 Put 
simply, suppose there is specific performance, and the promisor has a better 
opportunity. The non-breaching party will bargain to allow the promisor out 
of the contract. He will receive an amount equal to expectancy and a share 
of the profit associated with the breach. The authors refer to this as a 
bribe. 211 But, according to the parties, the potential to receive a bribe only 
comes at a cost. 212 The party who pays the bribe in order to escape the obli-
gation to perform will raise the contract price. 213 On the other hand, if the 
only remedy is expectancy, the price in the original contract will be lowered 
by the amount of the bribe. 214 Put differently, the party will charge less be-
cause it will be able to keep all the benefits of a breach once damages are 
paid. 215 They note that a rule allowing payment of damages would likely be 
206. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note I. 
207. Id. The authors begin with a summary of the criticisms of expectancy. !d. at 
1940-47. Among those is that a promisee who knows he or she may only receive the mone-
tary equivalent of performance will be reluctant to invest in the contract. The authors offer no 
support for the idea that expectancy results in underinvestrnent. Moreover, if expectancy is 
properly calculated, any lost investment would be fully compensated. 
208. Id. at 1950. 
209. !d. at 1950-51. 
210. !d. at 1951. 
211. !d. at 1950-51. 
212. Id. 
213. !d. 
214. !d. at 1951. The authors note evidence from experiments suggesting that there is 
a preference for specific performance and correctly note the flaws in those efforts. Id. at 1954 
n.32. 
215. This particular proposition was made by Richard Craswell over twenty years 
ago. See Craswell, supra note 30, at 642. 
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selected mainly because it lowers transaction costs and increases the net 
benefit associated with breach. 216 
In fairness, Markovits and Schwartz concede that they must make a 
series of assumptions to reach this outcome. 217 As is often the case, the as-
sumptions remove virtually all of the factors that explain the outcome of 
actual contractual relationships. 218 Moreover, it is not clear what is added to 
the efficient breach analysis.219 Having made the claim that expectancy and 
specific performance in a rational world of complete and evidently inexpen-
sive information in which sophisticated parties bargain are the same, 220 there 
does not seem to be an effort to square either remedy with efficiency. As a 
consequence, the argument can be reduced to, as far as efficiency, one rem-
edy is not worse than another, but neither may have very much to do with 
the efficient breach. 
In order to understand this last point, it is useful to break down the 
idea a bit more. In the case of specific performance or a property rule, the 
promisee pays a higher price in order to receive, should there be a breach, 
the compensatory amount plus a share of the gain. 221 And, if only damages 
are permitted, the promisee pays a lower price with the understanding that 
he will receive compensation, but no more. 222 In both cases, part of the 
award is expectancy. In effect, Markovits and Schwartz respond to critics of 
expectancy by basing their argument on the foundation of expectancy. 223 
Moreover, whether discussing specific performance or damages, they ap-
pear to ignore the issue of whether either one involves the correct level of 
internalization by the breaching party. 224 In this respect, Markovits and 
Schwartz enter the world that reminds one of Monroe Freedman's skyhooks 
and the relative advantages of one "hook" over the other. 225 That discussion 
would be useful if there were skyhooks and the Markovits and Schwartz 
discussion would be of interest and useful if there were any remedy that 
could achieve the efficient breach. 
Two elements of their defense are particularly worth noting. Both are 
related to their view that the parties, under their set of conditions, would 
216. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1945. 
217. /d. 
218. The authors indicate that the assumption basically tracks those made by people 
who are critical of expectancy. See id. There appears to be no support for this assertion. 
219. The authors argue that the efficient breach is a myth. /d. at 1948-49. Their rea-
soning is that a breach only occurs when a party neither performs nor pays damages. Id. at 
1948. 
220. !d. at 1987. 
221. See id. at 1941, 1950-51. 
222. See id. 
223. /d. at 1942. 
224. See generally id. In this respect, they seem to have lost sight of why economic 
analysis has been brought to bear on the subject of breach of contract in the first place. 
225. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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choose expectancy. First, they may have implicitly revived an old, and in 
this case, flawed idea. 226 The core of their proof is that whether one bargains 
only for expectancy or an absolute right to performance will be reflected in 
the price paid and that, except for transaction costs, the two are equiva-
lent. 227 Since expectancy is the less expensive route or the one that would 
result in the largest net profit, it is the one to which the parties would 
agree. 228 Thus, expectancy should be the default remedy. 229 
Here things become cloudy, and the reader should consult the original 
text. 230 The problem is that the notion of default is not clear. Typically, de-
fault rules apply when the parties have not expressly agreed to a specific 
term. Of course, there are instances in which agreement to a default term 
may be inferred. It may be that their point is that parties would generally 
agree to expectancy if they had thought about it. But if this is the point, the 
authors could have confirmed their hypothesis with a relatively simple sur-
vey. In short, it would have been an easy matter to test their theory. 
Still the question remains, can we assume if the parties had thought 
about it, they would have consented to expectancy? If so, two things would 
have to occur to make that appropriate. Without knowing it, the non-
breaching party must be "paid" in advance by virtue of a lower price for 
giving up the right to share in the profit associated with the breach. Second, 
because of that payment, the parties must be regarded as having consented 
in one way or another to the transaction that is unknown to him. 
Suppose the first condition is met and the price is lower. This raises 
the issue of whether, having been paid for the risk of a breach, one has 
"consented" to the consequences of the breach including being held to an 
expectancy remedy. In the early 1980s, Richard Posner made this claim as a 
way to suggest that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is morally defensible. 231 The 
relevant term was "ex ante compensation."232 In effect, if a party were sub-
jected to a loss in furtherance of a Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome, their 
consent could somehow be justified by ex ante compensation. For example, 
suppose a new neighbor begins raising pigs on property next to yours. The 
odor is awful, but it does tum out that the profit from hog raising is greater 
than the decline in the value of your property, and thus, hog farming is Kal-
226. See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1948. 
227. /d. at 1950-51. 
228. /d. at 1951-52. See discussion supra at notes 156-59. 
229. !d. at 1952 n.29. 
230. This part of the presentation is somewhat confusing in that the authors' summa-
tion is that they have defended the expectancy or the liability rule "on five related grounds." 
/d. at 2006. Is it not clear whether the grounds are necessary or sufficient. For example, one 
ground is that "the liability rule contract would be a good default." /d. Another ground is that 
"[a] promisee's consent to a liability rule default is actual rather than hypothetical." !d. 
231. See POSNER, supra note 68, at 95. 
232. /d. at 94. 
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dor-Hicks efficient. In the world of "ex ante compensation," you should 
have no complaints because the price you paid for your property was lower 
because you did not buy a right to a "pig free" environment. 233 
The notion of ex ante compensation as a form of consent has been dis-
credited.234 The problem is that the Markovits and Schwartz position with 
respect to expectancy as a default rule seems to raise the specter of ex ante 
compensation arguments again. If it does not, the implications of their hy-
pothesis are very narrow and could be tested. If it does, the analysis fails 
completely as far as any practical implications. Yet there appears nothing in 
this model to suggest that those without a right to specific performance ac-
tually do pay less. Moreover, if it could be shown that those without a right 
to specific performance pay less, there is no sensible connection between 
the "discounted" payment as "consent." 
Second, underlying the analysis seems to be the idea that parties 
would consent-actually consent-to expectancy damages because transac-
tion costs would be lower. In other words, the net surplus created by a lia-
bility rule would be higher than under a property rule, and therefore, a lia-
bility rule would be preferable to the parties. They would agree not to re-
quire specific performance. Here, again, the logic is not obvious. To under-
stand why, think about the Peevyhouses, and assume at the outset that Gar-
land Coal and the Peevyhouses can select an expectancy remedy or specific 
performance. They both understand that if specific performance is selected, 
the Peevyhouses will pay more, and for that extra payment, they will buy a 
share in any profit Garland Coal makes by not performing. The Peevyhous-
es also understand that paying more for specific performance will mean the 
profit (from the breach) to be split between the parties will be lower due to 
transaction costs. On the other hand, they also know that, even though under 
expectancy the profit will be larger, they will receive no share. 
In simple numerical form, suppose the profit from an expected breach 
is $10,000. 235 This is reduced to $9,500 if the transaction costs associated 
with negotiation are subtracted. Now the Peevyhouses must decide whether 
they prefer to pay to receive their full damages plus a share of the $9,500 
profit or pay less and receive nothing of the $10,000. What is missing here 
is any recognition of what is clear from studies of behavioral economics. 
Parties are quite willing to opt for something other than the maximum total 
payout if they do not feel they are receiving a fair share of the payout. The 
233. Interestingly, under a view of ex ante compensation as comparable to consent, 
the only way one could avoid consenting would be to refuse the compensation that one is 
likely to be unaware of in the first place. 
234. Coleman, supra note 68, at 534-39. 
235. To be accurate this must be expressed as "expected" profit because one part of 
the calculation is the probability that a breach will occur. 
208 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
theory that one party would consistently agree to maximize joint profit-in 
this case, choose the expectancy option-is simply not supportable. 
CONCLUSION 
When everything that can be said has been said, one may ask what one 
more article on the topic of "efficient breach" can add. The purpose of this 
Article is to demonstrate that there is no practical conception of the efficient 
breach. This Article focuses on the importance of internalization as the goal 
of efficient breach. The Kaldor-Hicks notion of efficiency may be the best 
place to start236 with respect to the assessment of expectancy, but it is ulti-
mately a deeply flawed concept of efficiency. Among other things, the 
complexity and fluidity of the ideas of rationality and welfare make the 
connection between efficiency and expectancy random for practical purpos-
es. Specific performance does overcome some of the problems of expectan-
cy by eliminating the false positive problem. On the other hand, it is an odd 
proposition that the way to achieve efficiency is by granting one party to a 
contract monopoly power-the antithesis of efficiency. Indeed, the down-
stream impact of specific performance just means that one economic evil is 
replaced by another. The efficient breach is no more than an "idea." 
Perhaps the good news is that, while scholars have been filling law re-
view pages with discussion of the efficient breach, courts have not been 
particularly interested in or persuaded by what they have written. 237 There is 
evidence that specific performance is more generally available than it was 
decades ago. 238 It is quite another matter to attribute this to economic argu-
ments found in legal scholarship. Although one cannot determine the impact 
of legal scholarship with confidence, citation rates for scholarly articles that 
one might have expected to be influential have been quite low. 239 Plus, the 
236. See supra Section II.A. This is because the Kaldor-Hicks standard would be the 
easiest to satisfy. There can be no interpersonal comparison of utility as required under utili-
tarianism. Under a Pareto standard, no breach without permission would be acceptable. 
237. As already noted, the term "efficient breach" is found a mere 140 times in a 
search using the Westlaw database "ALLCASES." See supra note 4. 
238. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic 
Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73, 98. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
The Influence of Law and Economics Scholarship on Contract Law: Impressions Twenty-
Five Years Later, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. I (2012). 
239. For example, Alan Schwartz's seminal article on specific performance, supra 
note 16, has been cited a total of twenty-five times since it was published in 1979. In no 
cases does it appear that his work influenced the decision. This search was conducted using 
the Westlaw database "ALLCASES." Similarly, Anthony Kronman's article on specific 
performance has been cited but six times. Kronman, supra note 13. There are, of course, a 
multitude of ways scholarship may influence the direction of the law without resulting in 
judicial citation, but at least based on this sliver of evidence, as it relates to two well-known 
scholars, one could not conclude that courts are responsive to scholarly arguments in favor of 
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more liberal attitude toward specific performance found in the UCC240 and 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,241 predated almost all economic ar-
guments. Whatever trend there may or may not be in favor of specific per-
formance, this Article demonstrates that it is not consistent with greater 
economic efficiency. Arguments that specific performance is more efficient 
apply a very myopic concept of efficiency. 
Interestingly, adherence to expectancy is also difficult to square with 
economic arguments. The application of expectancy means adhering to the 
status quo, which existed well before economic arguments emerged. Even if 
there were a link between economic analysis, expectancy, and the efficient 
breach, it would be inappropriate. There are simply too many variables in-
volved to confidently link to efficient breach. Despite all of this, legal 
scholars continue to debate the issue. Indeed the debate now may have come 
full circle as old and obsolete ideas are recycled. It may be appropriate to 
continue the discussion of skyhooks, but in the interest of linking legal 
scholarship to law, even broadly defined, perhaps the discussion should 
only continue when there is something new and useful to say. 
specific performance. Indeed Professor Macneil's early and thoughtful rejection of the notion 
of efficiency breach has been cited only twice in forty years. Macneil, supra note 11. 
240. See E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gu1f0il Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429,442 (S.D. Fla. 1975); 
Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 
1970). 
241. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts was adopted and promulgated by the 
American Law Institute in 1979. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981 ). 

